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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BILLIE PETERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

960025-CA

UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellee.

Priority No. 12

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellee Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company (hereafter
"Farm

Bureau")

urges

this

Court

to

deny

Billie

Peterson's

(hereafter "Peterson") underinsured benefits on three grounds: (1)
that the exclusive remedy provision, Utah Code Annotated, Section
35-1-60

(Supp.

benefits;

1994),

precludes

recovery

of

underinsurance

(2) that the Legislature intended the exclusive remedy

provision to preclude underinsurance benefits; and (3) the failure
to recover underlying liability insurance precludes recovery of
underinsurance benefits.

Its contentions are wrong.

Instead the

exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-60
does not bar Peterson from recovering underinsured benefits; the
legislature did not intend to preclude underinsurance coverage for
injured

employees; Peterson

is

legally

entitled

to

recover

underinsured benefits; and, Farm Bureau's alleged inability to

receive subrogation is irrelevant.

Peterson will address these

issues in order.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION, U.C.A., SECTION 35-1-60, DOES NOT
BAR PETERSON FROM RECOVERING UNDERINSURED BENEFITS.
Farm Bureau argues that the exclusive remedy provision
contained

in Utah's Workers' Compensation

Act precludes

recovery of underinsured benefits by an injured employee.

the
Farm

Bureau's argument misapprehends the theoretical underpinnings of
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act and the exclusive remedy provision
itself.
preclude

The exclusive remedy provision was never intended to
an

injured

employee's

recovery

against

his

own

underinsurance policy. Such an approach represents an unwarranted
expansion of the exclusive remedy provision and allows Farm Bureau
to reap an unearned windfall.
It is axiomatic in Worker's Compensation jurisprudence
that:
[o]nce a Workmen's Compensation Act has become
applicable either through compulsion or
election, it affords the exclusive remedy for
the injury by the employee or his dependents
against the employer and his insurance
carrier. This is part of the quid quo pro in
which the sacrifices and gains of employers
and employees are to some extent put in
balance, for, while employer assumes a new
liability without fault, he is relieved of the
prospect of large damage verdicts.
Larson, The Law of Workman's Compensation, Volume 2A
Section 65.11 (1995).
- 2 -

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized as much in Hunsaker
v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 899 (Utah 1993) where the Court stated that
"[t]he exclusive remedy principle embodies the basic quid quo pro
that underlies Utah's Workers' Compensation

scheme." Further,

"[u]nder the workers' compensation scheme, employees are able to
recover for job-related injuries without showing fault or being
subject to defenses such as the fellow servant rule and employers
are protected from suits by employees." Id. (emphasis added). See
also Bingham v. Lagoon, 707 P.2d 678, 679 (Utah 1985)(emphasis
added)("The essence of workers' compensation system is that it is
a mutual arrangement of reciprocal rights between an employer and
an

employee

whereby

both

parties

give

up

and

gain

certain

advantages."
More recently in Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah, 889 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1994) the Court stated that "[t]he
Workers' Compensation Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that
provides remedies for injuries to workers occurring in the course
of their employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu of common law
tort actions."
Farm Bureau does not address the theoretical basis of the
exclusive remedy provision, Farm Bureau inappropriately seeks to
extend its effect to non-employers and non-employees.

The above-

referenced cases illustrate that employees gave up the right to
pursue common law tort actions against employers and co-employees,
while employers gained

freedom

from excessive verdicts. Farm

Bureau, as a non-employer and non-employee, is not entitled to
- 3 -

obtain a windfall from its statutory scheme.

By entering into an

agreement with Peterson and accepting premiums for underinsurance
coverage, Farm Bureau entered into a contractual
Peterson.

relationship with

The exclusive remedy provision was not intended by the

Legislature to excuse third-party contractual obligations between
an employee and employer. Petersons claim against Farm Bureau is
more

in the nature of a contract, rather than tort claim.

Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision does not apply.
Point II
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO PRECLUDE UNDERINSURANCE COVERAGE
FOR INJURED EMPLOYEES.
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

31A-22-305(4)(b)(ii)

explicitly provides that: "This coverage does not apply to an
employee who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive
remedy is provided by Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation."
Subsections (8) through (10) of Section 305 addressing underinsured
coverage contains no similar provision.

In the space of one

statute, U.C.A. Section 31A-22-305, the Legislature stated its
clear Legislative intent that an injured employee may not receive
uninsured benefits. In that same statute, the Legislature fails to
indicate that underinsurance is similarly unavailable to injured
employees.

Further, the Legislature carried over the requirement

that uninsured benefits are "secondary to other insurance" over
into the underinsurance section of the statute.

Therefore, when

the Legislature wanted a requirement or limitation to apply, it
knew how to so provide.

The Legislature provided for one of the
- 4 -

two uninsured limitations in the underinsured context* The failure
of the Legislature to provide for "workers compensation" limitation
in the underinsurance coverage is a clear indication of Legislative
intent that the Legislature did not want an injured employee's
access to underinsurance benefits limited.

This omission is so

fundamental and so obvious that it shows that the Legislature
deliberately omitted the limitation in the underinsured context.
For example, in Western Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed, 788 P.2d
503, 506 (Utah 1990) the court addressed an apparent omission in
Utah's Procurement Code.

In a suit by a supplier under a payment

bond, the court noted that:
The Legislature had the opportunity to
affirmatively
indicate that remote tier
suppliers were covered by the Utah Procurement
Code. Instead, it chose language which seems
to. . . limit public bond coverage. . . We
therefore conclude that the intent of the
legislature was to exclude remote tier
suppliers such as [the plaintiff].
Id. at 506.
Analogously in the instant case, the Legislature's direct
omission in one portion of the statute of a phrase clearly stated
in another portion of the same statute is indicative of a direct
and unequivocal legislative intent that the underinsured coverage
is not limited by the exclusive remedy provision.
Apart from the plain language of the statute, there are
sound policy reasons for not allowing an injured worker to receive
uninsured benefits but allowing that same workers to receive
underinsured

benefits.

Uninsured
- 5 -

and

underinsured

benefits

represent two separate and distinct policies.

Couch on Insurance

2d (Rev.ed), Section 45:624 states that the policy underlying
uninsured coverage is "to provide protection to a certain class of
injured persons in the event of physical injury to covered persons
where

circumstances

dictate

that

compensation of their injuries."

no

coverage

exists

for

That is, Legislature wanted to

make certain that a minimum level of compensation be provided to
those injured by uninsured motorists.
assumes

a minimum

Conversely, underinsurance

level of coverage and seeks to provide an

additional level of coverage for motorists that have not been fully
compensated for their injuries.

If a motorist receives workers'

compensation benefits from a work-related automobile accident the
underlying policy of uninsured coverage is satisfied, i.e. that at
least some level of compensation is provided to the victim of an
accident. However, the same does not hold true for underinsurance
benefits.

An injured employee may not be made whole by workers7

compensation benefits.

To the extent that this is true in any

given case, the policy underlying underinsured benefits have not
been furthered.

Therefore, the structure of Section 305 could

easily be said to reflect the reality of the different policy
concerns underlying uninsured and underinsured policies. Although
Farm Bureau cites numerous cases, Peterson is not aware of any
which explicitly discuss the distinction between the recovery of
uninsured versus underinsured benefits by an injured employee also

- 6 -

entitled to workers' compensation benefits.1

This case presents a

unique opportunity for an appellate court to critically examine
this issue in light of the disparate policy concerns underlying
uninsured and underinsured policies.
Farm Bureau characterizes this argument as a "minor
technicality."

See Appellee's Brief, p. 18.

While Peterson

concedes that insurance law can be very technical, this is not an
adequate response to the argument.

Farm Bureau engages in a

lengthy proving of the obvious, citing fundamental principles of
statutory construction, and then fails to address the statutory
provision at issue, namely 31A-2-305.2 See Appellee's Brief, page
18-22. After failing to address the fundamental statutory language
at issue, Farm Bureau then mischaracterizes Neel v. State of Utah,
889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995).

On page 23 of its brief, Farm Bureau

states that Neel held "that workers' compensation is the exclusive
remedy of employees injured by uninsured and underinsured coemployees or an employer."
("The

See also Appellee's Brief, page 10

Utah Supreme Court in Neel v. State of Utah correctly

1

In Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 136,
138-39 (N.D. 1991) declined to discuss the difference between
uninsured and underinsured coverage noting only that the
plaintiff had "failed to present any cogent reason" to
distinguish the two and that both policies contain the phrase
"legally entitled to recover." It is Peterson's contention
that he has not only identified cogent, but compelling
reasons, to differentiate between uninsured and underinsured
coverage.
2

Rather than analyzing the language of Section 31A-223 05, Farm Bureau instead reiterates Point I of its brief
regarding the exclusive remedy provision.
- 7 -

interpreted the legislature's intent in holding that uninsured and
underinsured coverage did not apply to an employee whose exclusive
remedy is workers' compensation.").
Even a cursory reading of Neel reveals that the Court did
not hold, in the words of Farm Bureau, "that underinsured coverage
did not apply to an employee whose exclusive remedy is workers'
compensation." At issue in Neel was state employee's right to nofault benefits for injuries arising out of a work-related accident.
The Neel court itself states its holding as follows:
No-fault insurers, including self-insurers,
are required to pay PIP benefits to injured
employees to the extent those benefits exceed
workers' compensation benefits.
...

In so holding, we overrule IML Freight insofar
as it is inconsistent with this opinion.
Id. at 926.
Black's

Law Dictionary

454 (6th Ed. 1990) defines dictum

as: "Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of
law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to
determination of the case in hand. . . [w]hich lack the force of
adjudication."
8

See also Ruggles v. Ruggles. 860 P.2d 182, 189 n.

(N.M. 1993)(statement "unnecessary to decision of the issue

before the Court, was dictum, no matter how deliberately or
emphatically phrased.").
sought

underinsurance

Inasmuch as the plaintiff in Neel never
benefits,

any

statements

addressing

underinsurance benefits in Neel are dictum and need not be followed
by the Utah Court of Appeals.

See Chino Valley v. Prescott, 638

P.2d 1324, 1327 (Az. 1981)(Dictum is "a court's statement on a
- 8 -

question not necessarily involved in the case. . ., is without
force

of

adjudication

precedent.").

[and].

.

.

is

not

controlling

as

Further, because the Utah Supreme Court did not

consider the specific statutory language in Section 305 and did not
have the benefit of briefing on the issue, this Court should not
view the dictum as controlling.
Finally, the out-of-state case law cited by Farm Bureau
is distinguishable. The only case addressing underinsured benefits
is Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1991)
is distinguishable.

In Stuhlmiller. the plaintiff was injured in

a work-related single vehicle accident. Id. at 137. The plaintiff
was in his own car which was driven by a co-employee.

Id.

The

plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits and then sued
under the liability portion of his own insurance policy and the
underinsurance policy of the co-employee's policy.

Id. The court

denied underinsurance benefits noting that the co-employee was
statutorily immune from suit and not legally entitled to recover.
Id. at 138.
In the instant case, Peterson is not seeking underinsured
benefits from a co-employee.

Instead, Peterson has entered into a

contractual relationship with a third-party, Farm Bureau, which is
neither his employer nor co-employee. The fact that the plaintiff
in

Stuhlmiller

sued

his

co-employee

directly

implicates

the

exclusive remedy provision. Farmers Bureau has no right to rely on
the exclusive remedy provision, being neither an employer or coemployee in this case.
- 9 -

The remaining cases cited by Farm Bureau appear to
concern uninsured coverage and not underinsured coverage. Because
underinsured coverage furthers a separate and distinct legislative
goal than uninsured coverage, these cases are not controlling.
Point III
PETERSON IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDERINSURED BENEFITS
Farm Bureau argues that Peterson may recover underinsured
benefits because he is not "legally entitled to recover" damages
from the co-employee who caused his injuries.

This language is

found both in the insurance contract and U.C.A. Section 31A-2305(9). The phrase "legally entitled to recover" becomes ambiguous
in the underinsured context. The purpose of underinsured coverage
is to allow insureds to recover more money when the primary policy
limits are not sufficient to compensate the insured.
underinsured

coverage

adequate funds.

assumes3 the

tortfeasor

does

Thus,

not

have

Therefore, "legally entitled to recover" cannot

mean the ability to recover money from the tortfeasor.

A more

common sense notion of "legally entitled to recover" is presented
in Torres v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins., 849 P.2d 407 (Ok.
1993) where the Oklahoma Supreme Court re-affirmed
standing definition of

"legally

entitled

3

its long-

to recover"

in the

In fact, the exhaustion of the liability coverage of
the tortfeasor seems to be a precondition for recovery of
underinsured coverage.
- 10 -

uninsured/underinsured4 context.

The court stated that:

the phrase legally entitled to recover damages
simply means the insured must be able to
establish fault on the part of the uninsured
motorist which gives rise to damages and prove
the extent of those damages.
Id. at 410.
This definition furthers the policy of underinsured
coverage by allowing employees injured in work-related automobile
accidents to be made whole for their injuries.

It also provides

insurers a mechanism whereby they can assess whether an injured
employee has been made whole.
Point IV
FARM BUREAU'S
IRRELEVANT.

ALLEGED

INABILITY

TO

RECEIVE

SUBROGATION

IS

Farm Bureau argues that if Peterson is able to recover
underinsured benefits, it will be unable to obtain subrogation.
This argument was considered and rejected in Torres v. Kansas City
Fire & Marine Ins., 849 P.2d 407, 413 (Ok. 1993) where the court
stated that "only where the insured engaged in some affirmative act
or prejudicial conduct which destroyed the subrogation rights of
the insurance carrier. . . [would] the carrier's liability under
the UM endorsement be discharged." The court went on to state that
"[t]he immunity of the workers' compensation laws which would bar
any subrogation rights is not the result of any conduct on the part
of the insured and

affords no basis to deny recovery

4

[under

The insurance policy in Torres is characterized as a
"uninsured/underinsured" policy, yet most of the discussion
focuses on uninsured coverage.
• 11 -

prior Oklahoma decision].11

Id.

Further, the Utah Supreme Court has recently noted that
"subrogation must not work any injustice to the rights of others."
State Farm v. Northwestern National. 285 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16
(Utah 1996).
Here, Farm Bureau seems to suggest that it is simply
unfair for it to have to pay underinsured coverage when it is
unable to get the money back from the tortfeasor.

However, it is

more unfair for Peterson not to receive the benefit of underinsured
coverage when he has not been made whole and has paid the premiums.
In essence, Farm Bureau

is disturbed that

it, the insurance

company, must bear the risk of tortfeasor insolvency or immunity
rather than its insured. As a matter of sound public policy, it is
more appropriate that insurance companies rather than insureds bear
the risk of loss.
Farm Bureau's last argument merits little response. Farm
Bureau argues that Peterson may not recover underinsured coverage
because he has not recovered from the liability policy of the
tortfeasor. The critical inquiry is whether there is "insufficient
liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all
special and general damages." U.C.A. Section 31A-22-305(8)(a). In
the context of a work-related auto accident, the issue is whether
workers' compensation benefits have compensated the employee for
all special and general damages. This is a question of fact which
has not yet been resolved in this matter.
Liability coverage in this context need not refer solely
- 12 -

to automobile liability coverage, but could also refer to workers'
compensation coverage or perhaps even coverage pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

The important issue is whether the

injured party has been made whole.

If the insured has, then no

underinsured coverage is available.

If not, then underinsured

coverage is available.
CONCLUSION
Peterson respectfully requests that the trial court's
decision to dismiss Peterson's complaint be reversed and the case
be remanded for further proceedings to assess the severity of
Peterson's injuries.
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